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Abstract 
 
Over the last five years, the EU has sent more than 35 Election Observation Missions (EOMs) around 
the world. EOMs are often the most visible part of the EU’s efforts to promote democracy abroad and 
carry consequences for the EU’s overall policy towards a given country. While the methods and 
techniques of observing elections are well established, the linkage between the findings of observers and 
general political follow-up by the EU can be weak, in particular in cases where observers report 
significant flaws. The EU should be more coherent in these cases. The EU should also better address 
deterioration of democratic standards in its own member states, in order to maintain its credibility in this 
field. Given that the EU promotes a rule-based multilateral world order, it should have every interest in 
the legitimacy of its partner governments and the upholding of legally binding global standards for 
elections. 
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EXPORTING LEGITIMACY: 
THE RECORD OF EU ELECTION OBSERVATION 
IN THE CONTEXT OF EU DEMOCRACY SUPPORT 
MICHAEL MEYER-RESENDE 
1. Introduction 
Despite the renewed attention paid to democratisation issues in the wake of the ‘colour 
revolutions’,
1 one aspect of EU democracy support has received little attention, namely the 
deployment of Election Observation Missions (EOMs). In the last five years, the EU has sent 
more than 35 EOMs around the world. Election observation is located in the technical field of 
democracy support, but has to be seen in the context of the EU’s foreign policy, in particular 
because the EU deploys EOMs in its own name, rather than leaving this work e.g. to non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), as is the practice in the US.
2 
While election observers usually receive a lot of media attention, their work is rarely analysed 
by academia. In this paper we try to answer why and how the EU is observing elections, to put 
this activity in the broader context of the EU’s efforts in democracy promotion and to look at 
challenges facing this policy.  
Deploying election observers is an atypical form of democracy support: It is carried out within a 
short-time frame, requires large numbers of staff and implies significant political risks. EU 
EOMs may find that elections were flawed and the EU at large has to deal with the 
consequences of such findings. The greatest challenge to EU election observation is the 
relationship between the ‘technical findings’ of EU EOMs and the high-profile political follow-
up to observers’ findings in cases where significant flaws are reported. 
2.  Why is the EU observing elections in other states? 
One can distinguish three different contexts of EU democracy support, the first being in 
countries where there is an enlargement/integration rationale. Enlargements to Southern Europe 
(Greece, Spain and Portugal) and the East gave a prospect to and provided stability to young 
democracies. Short of enlargement, the logic of integration is applied in the EU’s new 
neighbourhood policy, whereby partner countries are offered closer political and economic 
integration in exchange for political reform,
3 namely democratisation. Secondly, there is the 
context of development cooperation. Democracy is seen as a means to improve governance and 
                                                 
1  See e.g.  Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress”, in M. Emerson (ed.), 
Democratisation in the Neighbourhood, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2005, p. 21. 
2  The US Government does not launch observation missions; instead, large US NGOs, such as the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Carter Center are deploying election observation missions. 
The NDI has also been instrumental in building and training domestic election observation organisations 
around the world. The UN has significant involvement in election assistance, but usually does not observe 
elections. 
3 In the new neighbourhood policy, notions such as ‘political reform’, ‘good governance’, ‘shared values’ 
and ‘democracy and human rights’ are often used interchangeably to describe the EU’s expectations of 
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attain the UN Millennium Development Goals, although, as we shall see later, democratisation 
is often perceived as being in conflict with stability in the context of development. Thirdly, 
democratisation is often a distinct objective in post-conflict situations, notably the holding of 
elections to establish a legitimate government. 
The promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are enshrined as foreign policy 
objectives in the EU’s legal and political order, in particular in Art. 11 of the EU Treaty, in the 
European Security Strategy
4 and in the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession. These have been 
made legally operational by democracy and human rights clauses in agreements with third 
states, such as the Cotonou agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific states.  
The observation of elections has become a ‘standard tool’ across the world in support of 
democratisation. While elections had been observed before, election observation, domestic and 
international, came into its own in the post-1989 transitions to democracy. Given the 
weaknesses of transitional elections, such as insufficient separation of powers, lack of a level 
playing field for contenders, lack of capacity of the state to manage elections, etc., observation 
became and has continued to be, a standard response to transitional elections. International 
election observers can add a layer of transparency to an election process, increase voters’ 
confidence, deter fraud and in repressive countries they can create space for domestic observer 
groups to report more freely. Given that flawed elections carry a considerable risk of violence, 
election observers also contribute to conflict prevention. Election observation activities, which 
seemed initially a temporary fashion of the ‘transitions euphoria’ of the 1990s, remain 
undiminished.
5 
Academics have described elections as a vertical form of accountability – the people holding the 
government accountable – while the concept of horizontal accountability deals with the question 
of constitutional checks and balances, ensuring that elected authorities are checked by relatively 
autonomous institutions and obliged to act in a lawful manner.
6 Seen in this framework, election 
observation missions focus primarily on vertical accountability, but they often touch on issues 
of horizontal accountability, e.g. when assessing how far the election administration or courts 
uphold the rule of law in election appeal proceedings, which becomes an issue whenever an 
election process is contested. Obviously election observation is an activity related to human 
rights, looking into the exercise of the right to vote and to be elected and freedoms of assembly, 
association and expression. 
3.  How is the EU observing elections? 
EU election observers appeared for the first time in the Russian parliamentary elections in 1993 
and the first elections in post-apartheid South Africa in 1994. This engagement continued 
throughout the 1990s (Mozambique 1994, Palestinian elections 1996, etc).
7 It was not until the 
second half of the 1990s, however, that serious thought was given by international organisations 
to the methodology of election observation. In Europe the OSCE’s Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was particularly instrumental in promoting a more 
                                                 
4  See European Council website (http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g). 
5  In the EU, the pressure tends to be towards observing more rather than fewer elections. 
6 G. O'Donnell (1999), “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, in A. Schedler, L. Diamond 
and M. F. Plattner (eds), The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in new democracies, 
Boulder; CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 29-51. 
7 For full overview, see Annex 1 of the Commission Communication on EU Election Assistance and 
Observation  (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0191en01.pdf). This 
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systematic and credible approach to election observation. The EU initiated its reform of election 
observation in 2000.
8 The thrust of the new approach, which is similar to that of the OSCE 
ODIHR, was to get away from election-day observation based on anecdotal evidence to a 
broader analysis of an election’s context and the collection of empirically relevant data. 
 
Box 1. Key aspects of EU election observation* 
Methodology 
-  EU EOMs, presence on the basis of invitation by authorities 
-  Long-term presence (starting some six weeks before elections) across country 
-  Analysis of political context, election laws and regulations, the campaign, quantitative/qualitative 
analysis of media coverage, statistical analysis of polling/counting; assessment of post-election 
process, notably complaints and appeals 
-  Assessment made on the basis of international/regional obligations and commitments a country has 
entered into, notably the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
Political set-up 
-  EU EOMs financed by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, managed by the 
European Commission, in consultation with the Council and the EP 
-  Chief Observer, normally a Member of the European Parliament 
-  EU EOM politically independent. Chief Observer decides on the basis of observers’ findings how to 
assess an electoral process 
_______________ 
*For more details, see Commission Communication on EU Election Assistance and Observation 
(http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0191en01.pdf), which was endorsed by the 
Council and the EP. See also Commission Staff Working Paper on the Implementation of the 
Communication on Election Assistance and Observation (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations 
/human_rights/doc/sec_2003_1472_en.pdf). 
 
There can be pressures to deploy smaller or shorter missions, but the EU has so far managed to 
maintain its approach. The thinking is that any precedent of ‘lighter’ missions could undermine 
the standards, allowing target countries to request smaller missions and be inherently unfair as 
some countries would be subject to more rigorous assessment than others. Different mission 
types could also undermine the EU’s reputation and credibility.
9  
All significant international observer organisations (e.g. OSCE, Organisation of American 
States, National Democratic Institute of the US, Carter Center, Commonwealth, etc.) follow the 
model of comprehensive observation; albeit to different degrees.
10 This methodology has 
recently been endorsed in the United Nations’ framework.
11  
By integrating the enjoyment of political rights and the strength of the rule of law in its analysis, 
this methodology presupposes a notion of liberal democracy, in line with international law.
12 
This approach does not allow a neat categorisation into ‘democracy’ (as the mere process of 
voting) and ‘liberalism’ (enjoyment of fundamental freedoms, constitutional checks and 
                                                 
8 See note 5. 
9 As one Sri Lankan politician put it recently to the author, “We want an EU election observation mission, 
because having observers all around the country they really know what is going on.” 
10 E.g. ‘scientific’ monitoring of media, i.e. measuring the time and tone given to candidates or parties in 
the media, is often only carried out by OSCE ODIHR and European Union EOMs. 
11 See http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1923_declaration_102705.pdf. 
12 Notably the UN’s International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. 4 | MICHAEL MEYER-RESENDE 
balances). Some authors have lamented the rise of ‘illiberal democracies’ as a result of over-
reliance by international actors on elections as opposed to broader political liberalisation.
13 
However, from the point of view of election observation, this term does not make sense, as 
election processes in illiberal circumstances are not considered to be democratic.
14 
Critical findings of EU EOMs show the variety of aspects that missions are looking into, e.g. the 
targeted exclusion of political competitors through selective law enforcement or on vague legal 
grounds (Rwanda 2003), ballot box stuffing and the manipulation of results during the process 
of vote aggregation (Nigeria 2003), the obfuscation of the vote tabulation process (Mozambique 
2004, 2005 – otherwise a generally open electoral system), systematic state repression against 
political opposition in the post-election period together with a loss of transparency in the result 
aggregation and publication (Ethiopia 2005) or the restriction to parties and overall political-
constitutional context of the elections (Pakistan 2002). 
4.  Why and where is the EU invited to observe? 
While other governmental observation organisations are tasked to assess elections of their 
member states, the EU observes elections outside its territory. This means that the EU cannot 
rely on standard Terms of Reference but has to negotiate in each case Memoranda of 
Understanding guaranteeing that it can carry out its operation according to its methodology. The 
EU tends to be the only major international governmental player
15 in regions that do not have 
regional bodies tasked with observing elections, notably Asia and the Middle East.  
Somewhat paradoxically, EU EOMs have not been deployed to candidate or accession 
countries. They have been sent to countries of lesser strategic importance to the EU in Africa, 
the Caribbean, Latin America and occasionally in Asia. This reflects the fact that by its original 
purpose, the EU has not been an actor in this field, which has instead been covered by 
specialised organisations such as the Council of Europe with its Court on Human Rights and the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE systematically 
observes elections in its participating transition states. All EU member states participate in the 
OSCE, so there has been no reason for the EU to send parallel observer missions to the OSCE 
region. Somewhat curiously to some EU accession/candidate countries, no comprehensive 
OSCE or EU observation mission has ever been deployed in Poland
16 or Turkey.
17 
                                                 
13 See Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad; New York, 
NY: W.W Norton and Co., 2003. 
14 Based on his own categories, Zakaria concludes that in countries like Kyrgyzstan and Kazahkstan, 
elections were “reasonably free”, but that these countries are not actually liberal democracies. However, 
apart from Zakaria, no one considered elections in those countries free and fair. The OSCE EOM to 
Kyrgyzstan considered that “the ability of particular political parties and candidates to be represented was 
systematically undermined”, while in the case of Kazahkstan, the OSCE judged the problems to be so 
serious that it did not even deploy an OSCE EOM. See OSCE reports (http://www.osce.org/odihr-
elections/14207.html). Zakaria thus creates a problem, which he then solves. 
15 The non-governmental Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute of the US also tend to be 
present in those countries.  
16 It should be noted, however, that Poland’s electorate has reliably dispelled any doubt one might have 
had about undue advantages of incumbency by changing the government in each election since 1990.  
17 With regard to Turkey, problems are generally considered to lie outside the election field. Short of 
sending an observation mission, the OSCE deployed an assessment team for the 2002 Parliamentary 
elections, which was generally positive, but highlighted the problem of political parties being dissolved 
and the 10% threshold for a party entering Parliament, which it considered “exceptionally high by 
European standards”. The OSCE pointed out that 45% of the electorate cast their vote for parties that EXPORTING LEGITIMACY | 5 
 
It is to be assumed that the EU will continue to refrain from sending EU EOMs to the OSCE 
region, at least as long as this task is credibly carried out by the OSCE. However, the Russian 
Federation, whose elections have been criticised by the organisation, is questioning the 
methodology. Russia has been particularly unhappy with the OSCE EOM’s findings in Georgia 
and Ukraine and its Foreign Minister has questioned the whole principle of OSCE EOMs.
18 In 
case of dilution of OSCE methodology, there would probably be pressure on the EU to deploy 
EU EOMs to the countries in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
The Southern Neighbourhood is the one region of strategic importance that has recently been 
more in the focus of the EU’s election observation. EU EOMs were present in Palestine for the 
2005 presidential and 2006 parliamentary elections and in Lebanon for the 2005 parliamentary 
elections.
19 Before 2005, the EU had only observed the post-Oslo Palestinian elections of 1996. 
Generally the EU has not been invited to observe elections in the region and most of them 
would not have been eligible given that they lacked the minimum conditions for democratic 
elections.  
Since election observation carries the risk of a negative report for the receiving state, why are 
election observers invited? In regional organisations tasked with observing elections of its 
participating states, there tends to be a standing agreement to invite observers to their elections. 
Given the difficulties currently created for NGOs operating in Russia, it is noteworthy to recall 
the OSCE’s Copenhagen commitment of 1990: “Participating States consider that the presence 
of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which 
elections are taking place. They therefore invite observers from any other CSCE participating 
States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations (…).”  
Even if not obliged by regional agreements to invite organisations, states have different reasons 
to invite observers. Observers are primarily invited where governments want to increase the 
legitimacy of an election process. They may hope that international observers will help address 
the issue of losing parties’ questioning the results or that a positive report will enhance the 
international standing of a country – a positive EU EOM report is one factor in the international 
image of a country with knock-on effects for political relationships, but probably also for a 
perception of political stability which favours foreign investment. In the case of the EU, the 
motivation may also be that a state has received significant financial support to hold elections 
and it would be strange not to invite the EU to observe those elections. International observers 
are sometimes invited by the election authorities of a given country; occasionally they may 
                                                                                                                                               
were then not represented in Parliament and that the high threshold “virtually eliminates” the possibility 
of regional or minority parties entering Parliament (http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14656.html). The 
European Commission 2005 Progress Report on Turkey did not mention elections or the election system 
in its evaluation of democracy and human rights issues (see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
enlargement/turkey/docs.htm). 
18 "La Russie se félicite qu'une nouvelle ‘révolution de couleur’ ait, pour l'instant, été évitée à Bakou", Le 
Monde, 11 November 2005. On this issue see Hrair Balian, “ODIHR’s election work: Good value?”, 
Helsinki Monitor , No.3, 2005. 
19 The EU EOM’s conclusion of the Lebanese elections may provide an answer to the debated question of 
the extent to which the elections represented a democratic breakthrough: “The elections were well-
managed and took place in a generally peaceful manner within the existing framework for elections. 
However, there is an urgent need for complete reform of the election framework. While it was legitimate, 
in order to respect the Constitution, to organise elections according to legal deadlines under the existing 
election framework, it is now vital to address the fundamental shortcomings of the electoral system and 
bring it in line with international obligations, such as the UN International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)” (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/ 
eu_election_ass_observ/lebanon/prelim_stat_200605_en.pdf). 6 | MICHAEL MEYER-RESENDE 
count on international observers to help them fend off political pressures on them.
20 In many 
parts of the world inviting international observers has become part of the ‘bon ton’ of an 
election process.
21 Governments rejecting international observers may look as if they have 
something to hide in a process which, by definition, should be transparent. Reluctant 
governments occasionally refer to an infringement of their state’s sovereignty, but this is a 
circular argument: in exercising the state’s, sovereignty any government can decide to invite 
election observers. 
The EU’s involvement in this field is a reflection of its being perceived as relatively neutral in 
many regions and as the successful co-operation of 25 functioning democracies. In this sense 
the EU serves as a provider of international legitimacy wielding significant ‘soft power’. It is 
inconceivable that any single state would deploy large-scale election observation missions, 
whether the US or any individual EU member state. It remains to be seen if the EU’s efforts to 
achieve more international coherence and the possibility of taking up military operations under 
the EU banner will change attitudes in the sense that the EU will be perceived more as a 
‘unitary’ actor, like the US, and less like a ‘small UN’. 
5.  How do EU EOMs fit into the context of EU democracy support? 
There are two layers of democracy promotion: first, through providing assistance to 
governments and NGOs and second through political responses to democratisation processes. 
As far as assistance is concerned, there is the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR).
22 Far greater sums are spent, however, through other budget lines for co-
operation (such as the European Development Fund), e.g. to support government capacities to 
hold elections. The EU is thus spending considerably more in supporting elections than in 
observing them. By way of example, the DR Congo elections were supported with €149 million, 
which is equivalent to the EU election observation budget of ten years. EU member states are 
also heavily engaged in democracy promotion, e.g. through the respective development 
agencies, the work of the German political party foundations, the UK Westminster Foundation, 
etc. 
As far as political responses to democratisation are concerned, these occur at various levels of 
formality and consequence. At the more formal end of the scale, the EU can make 
democratisation issues part of its official dialogue with a given country, it can include 
democratisation issues in agreed action plans (as is the case now in some countries of the EU’s 
‘new neighbourhood’), the European Commission will address democratisation issues in its 
official country strategy papers, etc. In cases of serious crisis, cooperation can be suspended 
(e.g. as the last resort under Art. 96 of the Cotonou agreement) and in case of ongoing violation, 
sanctions can be imposed (e.g. visa ban for Zimbabwean officials). On a more ad-hoc basis, the 
Union agrees on statements on elections or other democratisation issues, it may issue a 
demarche to a government if it is concerned with a particular situation or it may raise issues in 
                                                 
20 E.g. international election observers regularly came out with public support for the election officer of 
Sri Lanka, who had to made difficult decisions during heated election campaigns. In the Palestinian 
presidential elections of January 2005, the EU EOM reported on undue pressures exercised by members 
of the Fatah party on the Central Election Commission on elections day. The presence and reporting of 
international observers may help to weaken such pressures. 
21 Note that elections in EU member states are occasionally assessed by the OSCE; for all reports, see its 
website at http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14207.html. 
22 The EIDHR has a budget of €100 million, some €14 million of which are usually earmarked for EU 
EOMs. EXPORTING LEGITIMACY | 7 
 
talks between government representatives at various levels. At the least-formal end of the scale, 
there are other ways of conveying political messages, by making phone calls, by inviting or not 
inviting officials to international summits and other meetings, etc. Various actors can be 
involved in this: the Commission, in particular through its cooperation policies, the Council in 
the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) framework and the EP (European 
Parliament), through its role in development cooperation and through its own relationships with 
third countries.  
The standard immediate response to an election is an EU declaration, which is issued by the EU 
Presidency after consultation with partners. In cases where an EU EOM is deployed, this would 
usually occur after the mission has published preliminary findings. The EP sometimes adopts 
resolutions on elections.
23  
6.  Record and experiences of EU EOMs 
Since 2000, some 35 EU EOMs have been deployed to some 30 countries (see the Annex). This 
has involved thousands of EU citizens travelling to far-flung places for months or weeks with 
the objective of assembling an accurate understanding of a given election process. Findings of 
EU EOMs have ranged from the positive (Guinea-Bissau 2005, Palestine 2005, Indonesia 
2004,
24 Kenya 2003) via mixed findings (Sri Lanka progressively better 2001, 2002, 2004; 
Malawi 2004, Mozambique 2003, 2004) to the negative (Ethiopia 2005, Rwanda 2003, Nigeria 
2003, Pakistan 2002). 
EU EOMs’ findings have often been criticised: invariably by governments that did not agree 
with negative findings, but also by opposition or the losing parties which may have thought 
findings were too positive. While overall conclusions have been challenged, detailed findings 
(e.g. on election-day statistics, media coverage, legal framework) have never been questioned 
with one exception.
25 The accusation most easily levelled at EU observers is that they apply 
European standards without understanding the context of a country. However, critical EU EOM 
findings have not been based on ‘local’ problems such as the lack of infrastructure, limited 
understanding of the polling process by officials or other problems inherent in any election 
process in transition countries,
26 but rather on such issues as ballot box stuffing, manipulation at 
the level of result aggregation, exclusion of political competitors by selective law-enforcement, 
etc. Manipulation of this type usually requires bureaucratic-administrative skills which are 
independent of a given cultural context. 
Judging by the sample of elections observed by the EU, it appears that strong governments 
intertwined with dominant parties tend to be the greatest challenge to genuinely democratic 
                                                 
23 See e.g. EP resolution of 10 October 2005 on recent elections in Ethiopia 
(http://www.europarl.eu.int/registre/seance_pleniere/textes_deposes/prop_res_commune/2005/0540/P6_R
C(2005)0540_EN.pdf#search='european%20parliament%20resolution%20ethiopia). 
24 References to specific elections in this paper are based on EU EOM findings, if not otherwise indicated. 
All EU EOM reports can be found on: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/ 
eu_election_ass_observ/index.htm. 
25 President Meles of Ethiopia published a series of long newspaper articles explaining, from his point of 
view, why the EU EOM arrived at the wrong conclusion.  
26 The EU EOM to Pakistan, for example, was explicit on this point in 2002: “(…), the EU EOM 
concluded that polling day itself had gone relatively smoothly and that any shortcomings were the 
consequence of inadequate training and administrative arrangements rather than the consequences of 
intended abuse”. 8 | MICHAEL MEYER-RESENDE 
elections.
27 In the absence of dominant governments/parties, even extremely fragile, poor and 
volatile countries have recently seen relatively credible competitive elections (Burundi, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, all in 2005).  
Post-conflict elections in countries where there continue to be high levels of violence have 
posed problems from a point of view of election observation. The EU did not consider the 
conditions suitable for deployment of EU EOMs for the Iraqi presidential elections in 2004
28 
and the Afghan presidential elections in 2004.
29 In Iraq there have been reports recently that the 
2004 elections were manipulated;
30 such allegations would be easier to deal with had there been 
independent observer groups.  
7. Challenges 
Methodology 
While the main pillars of election observation methodology have been established and are 
recognised, there are areas for refinement and improvement. Election observation will be 
particularly tested in the coming years by electronic voting, which in many cases does not allow 
for direct observation. Organisations will have to negotiate meaningful ways of carrying out 
observation, e.g. review of software, permission to verify sample of results on a random basis, 
etc. The observation of election complaints and appeals are other areas that often cause 
difficulties. An election is only concluded and can only be fully judged once contestants have 
exhausted their remedies. This becomes difficult when court appeals take a long time. For 
example, after the Nigerian elections in 2003 appeals were addressed in the courts for a period 
of years, which in itself is a concern.
31   
Follow-Up to EU EOMs’ findings 
There can be a risk that EU Election Observation is seen as a useful contribution to an election 
process and an act of ‘public relations’ in which the Union is seen to be doing something 
(‘raising the flag’), without however thoroughly following up on the findings of such missions 
and their political consequences. The deployment of missions raises great expectations with 
voters
32 and other stakeholders in elections. They believe that the full weight of the EU stands 
behind these missions, that they report critically if need be and that political consequences are 
                                                 
27 All critical EU EOM reports came from countries with dominant party conditions: Ethiopia 2005, 
Rwanda 2003, Pakistan 2002. Nigeria (2003) is a special case in that it is pluralistic in principle, but 
observers noted serious irregularities in states where President Obasanjo’s People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP) dominated. 
28 In this instance, the EU provided significant support for the UN to organise elections, assisted the Iraqi 
Independent Election Commission and trained domestic election observers. 
29 But the EU deployed a ‘Democracy and Election Support Mission’, in addition to giving significant 
financial support for UN efforts. 
30 Seymour M. Hersh in The New Yorker, 25 July 2005 (http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/ 
articles/050725fa_fact). 
31 For a list of other issues for improvement for OSCE EOMs see Hrair Balian, “ODIHR’s election work: 
Good value?”, Helsinki Monitor, No. 3, 2005. The list is equally valid for EU EOMs. 
32 A rather strong expression of this was reported in the Lebanese newspaper An Nahar, 23 May 2005: 
“One shopkeeper in Barbour, Abdel-Rahim Zahed, 53, agreed with Khaleel, and got his wife a voter's 
card for the first time in her life. He said: I thought it was important to get the whole family involved in 
this election since the elections are now going to be clean with the EU observing that everything goes 
well and according to the law."  EXPORTING LEGITIMACY | 9 
 
drawn where elections go wrong. However, there is no guarantee that their findings are fully 
taken into consideration politically.  
The somewhat paradoxical finding of recent years is that those missions that reported very 
critically had less political follow-up then those whose findings were mixed. The EU EOM for 
the presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda in 2004 concluded that the election 
process, the first after the 1994 genocide, had resulted in less pluralism in the country. The main 
opposition party had been dissolved before the elections, opposition figures had disappeared, 
were arrested or forced into emigration, there appeared to be manipulation in a number of 
polling stations and the national tabulation of votes was not transparent. Nevertheless, the EU 
has not formally taken up the case in its dialogue with the Government of Rwanda. The EU 
EOM to the presidential, parliamentary and state elections in Nigeria 2004 concluded that the 
elections were manipulated in at least one-third of the country, which would affect the overall 
outcome of the elections. The issue was also not taken up in an official manner by the EU. 
The EU EOM to the Pakistan elections of 2002, which came to negative conclusions about the 
process, was only followed up in the sense that the Chief Observer of the EOM, who was also 
the European Parliament rapporteur on the ratification of a ‘third generation’ cooperation 
agreement with that country, recommended not ratifying it. The EP ratified the agreement only 
in 2004.  
In contrast to these negative findings, EU EOMs which came to mixed findings (Mozambique, 
Malawi) were properly followed up, primarily by their recommendations being integrated into 
the official EU political dialogue with those countries. 
There are various explanations for this paradoxical situation. There are first of all competing 
foreign policy priorities, be they economic interests (Nigeria) or fear of internal and regional 
destabilisation (Nigeria, Rwanda, and Pakistan). Secondly, election observation is in many ways 
the most sensitive part of human rights work. While raising human rights concerns ordinarily 
does not question the legitimacy of one’s interlocutor, serious election concerns do exactly that. 
Raising the problem of fraudulent elections implies that the population may not have actually 
elected the current president or parliament. It is difficult to make such a point with the 
government of a partner country and usually it takes the additional element of widespread 
repression and human rights violations for the Western governments to question the legitimacy 
of a government to represent their country (Zimbabwe, Belarus). While it should not be too 
difficult to call on a government to improve its human rights record, it is considerably more 
difficult to call on a government to hold new elections and put its own existence into question.  
It is clear that foreign actors can only complement domestic pressures for political and judicial 
review of a flawed election process or to trigger re-elections.  Foreign actors cannot single-
handedly achieve these tasks and eventually often have to accommodate a government even 
though there may be doubts about its electoral legitimacy. However, this starting point cannot 
lead to the conclusion that the uncomfortable issue of flawed elections should be ignored 
altogether.  
An actor such as the EU carries out foreign policy on multiple layers and has numerous ways to 
keep issues on the agenda: it can be made part of the political dialogue with a country, it can be 
raised in multilateral fora, the disbursement of development aid can be adjusted, there can be 
technical assistance to help prepare the next elections. Technical assistance is often the preferred 
option as it is inoffensive, while more political measures are uncomfortable. However, if 
progress is to be achieved, governments must feel that there are incentives for democratic 
elections and disincentives for falsifying election results. The urge to avoid the subject creates 
incentives for repetition. Democratisation and the running of genuinely democratic elections are 
long-term tasks. The best international contribution to such a process is consistency in dealings 10 | MICHAEL MEYER-RESENDE 
with a country, making clear that this is a primary issue for the relationship, avoiding ambiguity 
and thus creating an environment in which poor elections become an obvious embarrassment. 
The steady improvement of elections in Albania is an example of how consistency and long-
term engagement bears fruit: The OSCE deployed six EOMs to Albania over the course of eight 
years and had numerous discussions on electoral reforms with all players.
33  
The difficulties in addressing flawed elections are not unique to the EU. The US and other 
actors struggle as much with follow-up to problematic elections.
34 However, there may be 
particular factors at work which particularly inhibit the EU in this field. There is first of all a 
cultural factor. Most European states existed for centuries without being democracies. Their 
identity is based on shared history, language, culture and less on a political community, which is 
the main layer of identity for the US.
35 For example, one of Europe’s oldest states, Portugal, has 
been a democracy for barely 5% of its illustrious 1,000-year-history.
36 Thus the European reflex 
tends to be that ‘life goes on’, even though a partner government may suffer from problems of 
legitimacy. However, this attitude sits uneasily with the European ambition to build a legitimate 
multilateral world order: for how could this be possible without governments which enjoy 
internal legitimacy? The EU security strategy acknowledges as much:  
The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its 
foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic 
states.
37 
A second reason for European reluctance, linked to the question of a pre-democratic perception 
of the state, is a concern with the functioning of states and the risks of failed states. One of the 
more impressive achievements of modern Europe has been the building of functioning states 
and bureaucracies that operate efficiently, and usually, neutrally, beyond the underlying power 
relations or legitimacy of a given government. The functioning of a neutral civil service is a less 
powerful idea in the US where many public functions are contested in elections and where the 
role of the state can be weak in the face of parties’ influence and power struggles.
38 In European 
                                                 
33 Re: Albania’s improvements, see Mungiu-Pippidi, op. cit., p. 21. 
34 For example, the US response to the recent election process in Ethiopia was more muted than that by 
the EU. The problems of the Ethiopian elections, involving killings of dozens and the arrest of thousands 
of opposition supporters were more serious than e.g. those in Ukraine last year. 
35 See Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 141.  
36 Another of Europe’s old states, England/the UK, has a state history more intertwined with the 
development of democracy and is generally more at ease with democracy promotion, albeit with 
moderation. “Concerned, but not obsessed”, as a UK diplomat put it. 
37 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy, 12 December 
2003, Brussels, p. 10 (http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g). 
38 In the election field the weakness of the state could be seen in the dispute over the 2000 Presidential 
elections. At the outset the rules of the game were influenced by the Republican-controlled executive of 
Florida, after the elections the demands of the Democratic party were upheld by the State court of Florida 
(dominated by Democrats) and finally rejected by the US Supreme court (dominated by judges appointed 
by Republicans). Partisan struggle was clearly visible in the work of state institutions. An election with 
very close results poses a significant challenge to the election administration and the judiciary anywhere 
in the world. However, a US-type struggle is unlikely in Western-European democracies where civil 
services are better insulated, by law and by self-identity, against partisan influence. In the German federal 
elections of 2002 the Social-Democratic/Green Coalition won with the smallest margin of several 
thousand votes without the process being contested by anybody.  The strong hand of the parties in the US 
can also be seen in the process of de-limiting electoral districts. The parties influence this in order to 
reduce the number of truly contested districts, thereby reducing campaign costs. This makes results in EXPORTING LEGITIMACY | 11 
 
development circles, there is a fear that the politicisation of development aid and elections are 
often intuitively considered a threat to stability, despite important findings that democracy and 
the general expansion of freedoms contribute to development, e.g. the much-quoted finding that 
famines have never occurred in democracies, as poor as they may have been.
39 It is noteworthy 
that the last Commission Communication on the ‘EU strategy for Africa’
40 mentions variations 
of the word ‘stability’ 40 times, but variations on ‘democracy’ only 14 times and mainly in a 
specific sub-chapter on governance. Furthering democracy is mainly described as a means to 
achieve other goals, not as an objective in itself. 
The pre-occupation with stability and conflict is justified. There have been elections that 
triggered the resumption of civil wars (Angola 1992, Burundi 1993). However, these cases 
cannot trump concerns in relation to a problematic election process. Election fraud that remains 
unaddressed has its own serious conflict potential. The less stakeholders trust the electoral 
process, the more likely they are to use extra-legal means to reverse the results. There should 
instead be more conflict assessment at the outset of democratisation processes and before 
elections as well as more in-depth analysis of the effects of electoral competition, elections 
systems, etc. Elections cannot be treated as a mere technical exercise. Any technical issue can 
have tremendous political implications. As a part of the pre-election analysis all EU institutions 
should consider options as to how to respond to an election process that goes wrong. While 
there may be competing foreign policy interests in each country, there should be a minimum 
degree of coherence between responses to elections, depending on their quality. 
Coherence: External and Internal Dimension 
In a world which is growing ever-smaller and where any kind of information may only be a few 
mouse-clicks away, it is even more important to operate coherently as a foreign policy actor. 
Looking at the issue of observing elections, there are two dimensions of coherence: external and 
internal. Externally it means that the Union must be careful to apply the same measures and to 
evaluate similar situations in a similar way even though countries may be far away from each 
other. It is easier for the OSCE to achieve this kind of coherence as its Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights is managing missions with permanent expert staff. It is a little 
more difficult in the EU context. As shown, EU EOMs operate independently under the Chief 
Observer, who may not have an overview of EU EOM assessments in other countries. The onus 
is therefore on the permanent staff in the institutions to convince EU EOMs to stay in line with 
earlier EU EOM ‘case-load’. 
There is also an internal dimension. While the EU deploys EU EOMs abroad, it has no powers 
to do so inside. Once candidate countries have passed the Copenhagen test and joined the club, 
the EU has lost most of its powers of looking into the democratic standards of its member states. 
As the media situation in Italy shows, this can become problematic. One mechanism that has 
been established by the European Commission on the recommendation of the European 
Parliament is an expert network reporting on the respect of human rights across the Union.
41  
                                                                                                                                               
many districts a foregone conclusion. The confessional voting system of Lebanon leads to a similar 
situation, where many seats are not genuinely contested. 
39 Re: the whole complex of development and democracy, see Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 6, 1999. 
40 Neither ‘democracy’ nor ‘elections’ is mentioned in the introduction or the conclusions of the 
Communication (for full text, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/communications/docs 
/eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf#zoom=100). 
41 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/index_en.htm. The EU intends to set up a 
European Human Rights Agency (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/rights/doc/ 
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The network commented in its 2003 report in the context of the Italian situation that “the 
institutions of the Union, and in particular the Commission, if they consider it desirable, have 
the required powers to formulate rules imposing on the Member States to take measures 
ensuring that pluralism in the media is respected (...)”
42. However, the European Commission 
declined to propose legislation on the issue.
43 The Council of Europe has been a little more 
forthcoming: “In Italy, the potential conflict of interest between the holding of political office 
by Mr Berlusconi and his private economic and media interests is a threat to media pluralism 
unless clear safeguards are in place, and sets a poor example for young democracies.”
44 
The Mixing of Agendas: Democracy Support and Regime Change 
In many Western policy circles, the ‘revolutions’ in Ukraine and Georgia are considered highly 
successful examples of coordinated local and international intervention to actively promote a 
transition agenda. Both cases produced what is generally elusive in democratisation work: 
concrete and highly visible results. Election observation played a key role in both cases. The 
OSCE observation missions found in both countries that the process and the official results 
lacked credibility and failed to meet OSCE standards. These findings backed the opposition’s 
position in both cases.  
However, the effects of Georgia and Ukraine are mixed, because they have led to an excessive 
linkage of election observation (and other democracy support) with ‘regime change’. Election 
observation relies on strict impartiality and neutrality and the perception thereof. It will be 
important to continue stressing that election observation is occupied with process rather than 
results and that it is not designed to undermine governments. Not only are observer missions 
regularly positive about a process, they also occasionally explicitly defend it against criticism 
by the opposition.
45   
8. Conclusions 
Elections do not equate to democracy, but are a central concept of it. Elections carry the risk of 
instability, because any genuinely democratic election can upset vested political interests. A 
greater risk results, however, from flawed elections, because they offer little incentive for 
competitors to accept results and provoke extra-constitutional challenge. Increasing the quality 
of elections is thus a contribution to long-term stability and conflict-prevention. Election 
observation missions, by their presence, support the holding of genuinely democratic elections, 
but at the same time record the quality of the process. 
The EU has a track record of successful election observation in recent years across the globe. 
This is politically sensitive work, as the findings of observers may strain the relationship of the 
EU with a given government or its opposition parties. A lot of effort has been made to 
                                                 
42 See EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, “Report on the Situation of 
Fundamental Rights in the European Union in 2003”, January 2004, p. 73, (see 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/report_eu_2003_en.pdf). 
43 “Concerning media pluralism, the public consultation [developed on the basis of the Green Paper on 
services of general interest of 21 May 2003 highlighted that, in the light of the differences that exist 
across the Member States, the issue should be left to the Member States at this point in time.” (see White 
Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(2004) 374 final of 12.5.2004, par. 4.6. 
44 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1589 (2003), paragraph 12 
45 E.g. the EU EOM to Mozambique in 2004 confirmed some opposition concerns, as did the 
Constitutional Council subsequently, but did not subscribe to the overall negative assessment by the main 
opposition party which lost the elections. EXPORTING LEGITIMACY | 13 
 
professionalise this activity and after 15 years of global election observation, there is now an 
established methodology used by all major international election observation groups.  
However, more efforts could be made to politically respond to flawed elections. Even before a 
difficult election process, potential political responses could be considered by all relevant EU 
institutions. In the case of flawed elections, the EU may not be able to remedy or reverse the 
process, but it should use its instruments of foreign policy to respond. While promotion of 
democracy and elections cannot be the exclusive objectives of foreign policy, they should 
nevertheless be given the priority that the treaties accord them. The EU should in particular 
continue to raise the issue of flawed elections with relevant governments and create incentives 
for better performance in the future. These responses should be coherent globally to make sure 
that the EU’s interest in democracy and elections is not perceived as a selective one. The 
continuing attraction of the EU as a credible actor with considerable soft power providing 
‘international legitimacy’, will depend on a coherent and systematic approach in this field too. 
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Annex 
EU Election Observation  
Missions and Key Findings, 2002-05 
Country/ Year  Type of Election  Findings 
Venezuela 2005 
 
Parliamentary  “Wide sectors of the Venezuelan society do not have trust in 
the electoral process and in the independence of the electoral 
authority. The legal framework contains several 
inconsistencies that leave room for differing and contradictory 
interpretations. (…) 
The CNE, in a positive attempt to restore confidence in the 
electoral process, took significant steps to open the automated 
voting system to external scrutiny and to modify various 
aspects that were questioned by the opposition. (…) The EU 
EOM took note with surprise of the withdrawal of the majority 
of the opposition parties only four days before the elections. 
Election Day passed peacefully with a low turnout. (…) These 
elections did not contribute to the reduction of the fracture in 
the Venezuelan society. In this sense, they represented a lost 
opportunity.” Preliminary Statement 
Sri Lanka 2005  Presidential  “Election day in the South proceeded satisfactorily and was an 
improvement on 2004. However voting in the North and East 
was marred by violence accompanied by an enforced boycott 
by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan), resulting in 
extremely low voter participation in many areas.” Preliminary 
Statement 
Liberia 2005  Presidential & 
Parliamentary 
“The 11 October 2005 presidential and legislative elections 
and the 8 November 2005 presidential run-off election were 
peaceful, generally well administered and marked an 
important step forward in the process of returning Liberia to a 
normal functioning state. Voters were provided with a wide 
range of political contestants in a genuinely competitive 
election process, and in contrast to the elections of 1997 were 
able to cast their ballots free from fear.” Final Report 
Burundi 2005  Parliamentary   “A long process of democratisation, a tense campaign, a 
people determined to regain peace and liberty: the ingredients 
of a successful vote, marginally disturbed but well organised 
to allow the expression of universal suffrage”.  Preliminary 
Statement (translation from French by the author) 
Guinea-Bissau 2005  Presidential   “The second round of the Presidential elections on 24 July 
2005 was generally well organized, in a transparent and 
inclusive manner, and met essential international principles for 
democratic elections.” Preliminary Statement 
Afghanistan 2005  Parliamentary   “Largely peaceful election day and generally well-
administered election process so far, despite shortcomings and 
challenges ahead, mark an important step forward for 
Afghanistan.” Preliminary Statement  
Lebanon 2005  Parliamentary  “The elections were well managed and took place in a 
peaceful manner within the existing framework for elections. 
However, there is a need for urgent reform of the legal and 
election framework”. Final Report  EXPORTING LEGITIMACY | 15 
 
Ethiopia 2005  Parliamentary 
& State  
“On Sunday 15 May Ethiopian citizens turned out in massive 
numbers to vote in the most genuinely competitive elections 
the country has experienced in spite of a number of restrictions 
on the full exercise of political rights and some violations of 
human rights in the pre-electoral period.” First Preliminary 
Statement “Despite significant efforts by the election 
administration to establish a complex system to deal with 
complaints, overall the process failed to provide an effective 
remedy to the parties.” Statement on the Election Complaints 
Process 
West Bank, Gaza 
2004 
Presidential  “The 9 January 2005 election for the president of the 
Palestinian Authority represented a genuine effort to conduct a 
regular electoral process. Despite the difficult and tense 
conditions, Palestinian electoral authorities made adequate and 
sufficient arrangements for voters and the public was 
enthusiastic to exercise its democratic rights. However, the 
occupation and continuing violence as well as restrictions on 
freedom of movement meant that a truly free election was 
always going to be difficult to achieve.” Final Report 
Mozambique 2003  Presidential & 
Parliamentary 
“The country benefits from a pluralistic political environment 
and relatively open media. The campaign and voting were 
orderly, but the election process was marked by serious 
shortcomings in the election administration, in particular as 
regards counting and tabulation of votes.” Final Report 
Malawi 2003  Presidential & 
Parliamentary  
“While the 20 May elections were conducted in a generally 
peaceful environment, voting proceeded smoothly, and they 
resulted in a change in the political composition of parliament, 
they fell short of international standards in a number of key 
areas.” Final Report 
Sri Lanka 2003  Parliamentary   “Overall, it would be fair to conclude that the 2004 elections 
were largely conducted in a democratic manner, apart from the 
North and the East. If the election results in the North and East 
had been a critical factor in determining who formed the 
government, it would have raised questions about the 
legitimacy of the final outcome.” Final Report 
Indonesia 2003  Presidential & 
Parliamentary 
“The entire electoral process was conducted largely in line 
with democratic standards. However, some unnecessary 
restrictions of the right to vote and stand were still in place. 
Public confidence was facilitated by the clear-cut nature of the 
results.” Final Report 
Mozambique 2003  Local  “Both the electoral campaign and the election day took place 
in a calm atmosphere free of intimidation, without any serious 
incidents or irregularities. The media covered the elections in 
an adequate manner. Nevertheless there were some 
shortcomings in the administration of the elections”. Final 
Report  
Guatemala 2003  Presidential, 
Parliamentary 
& Local  
“The results reflect the will of the people who could vote 
under free and secure conditions, but the election framework 
did not allow voters exercise their right to vote.” Preliminary 
Statement (translation from Spanish by the author) 
Cambodia 2003  Parliamentary   “Elections well conducted but still some way to go to full 
democracy”. Press Statement 16 | MICHAEL MEYER-RESENDE 
Rwanda 2003  Constitutional 
Referendum 
Presidential & 
Parliamentary 
 
 
“Generally the elections were well organised from a logistical 
point of view and the election days were calm. Nevertheless, 
serious problems affected the election campaign and the 
election days. Competition was unequal and without real 
opposition. The FPR (Rwandan Patriotic Front) and its 
candidate Paul Kagame dominated in both election campaigns 
which were furthermore marked by a climate of intimidation, 
interrogations and arrests. On election days numerous 
irregularities and instances of fraud took place and there was a 
manifest lack of transparency in the process of the 
consolidation of results”. Final Report Presidential and 
Parliamentary Elections (author’s translation from French) 
Nigeria 2003  Presidential, 
Parliamentary 
& State  
“The National Assembly Elections (12 April) took place in a 
generally peaceful manner. However, the process was marked 
by serious shortcomings and delays in the electoral 
preparations. (…)The Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections 
(19April) were marred by serious irregularities and fraud. In a 
number of States the minimum standards for democratic 
elections were not met. (…).The States’ House of Assemblies 
elections  (3 May) were marred by serious electoral fraud 
(ballot box stuffing, multiple voting and forgery of results) in 
Cross River, Delta, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Kaduna and Rivers.” 
Final Report 
Kenya 2002  Presidential, 
Parliamentary 
& Local  
“In conclusion, the EU EOM was impressed by the conduct of 
the 2002 elections. However, it wishes to re-iterate its 
concerns with regard to the instances of violence and 
disturbances which were observed during these elections and it 
wishes to stress the importance of addressing the shortcomings 
in the electoral framework.” Final Report 
Madagascar 2002  Parliamentary 
 
“Given the globally positive evaluation by the EOM (...) it is 
nevertheless useful to highlight a certain number of problems 
in order to offer valuable recommendations.” Final Report 
(author’s translation from French) 
Pakistan 2002  National & 
Provincial  
Assembly  
“The holding of a general election does not in itself guarantee 
the restoration of democracy. The unjustified interference with 
electoral arrangements, as detailed above, irrespective of the 
alleged motivation, resulted in serious flaws being inflicted on 
the electoral process.” Final Report 
Ecuador 2002  Presidential & 
Parliamentary 
“Despite various irregularities, especially during the first 
round of 20 October, the elections in Ecuador can be 
considered acceptable in terms of electoral procedures and a 
further step in the consolidation of democracy.” Final Report 
Sierra Leone 2002  Presidential & 
Parliamentary 
“The peaceful 2002 elections mark a first step to return to 
democracy in Sierra Leone, but the peace and the democratic 
process remain fragile.” Preliminary Statement 
East Timor 2002  First Presidential   “Overall, as we said in our preliminary statement after the 
declaration, this was an election result in which we could have 
full confidence.” Final Report 
Congo-Brazzaville 
2002 
Presidential   “The most positive aspect observed was the calm throughout 
the election process, including on election day. (...) In this 
post-conflict period this could not be understood as a classical 
election with candidates and political programmes.  EXPORTING LEGITIMACY | 17 
 
The implementation of various stages of the election process 
(voter registration; campaign; participation of the opposition in 
the electoral bodies; media; civic education; voting and 
consolidation of results) must be improved”. Final Report 
(translation from French by the author) 
Cambodia 2002  Communal (local)  “To conclude, whilst the EU EOM has noted some consolida-
tion of various aspects of the democratic process, it also noted 
some serious irregularities and malpractices which continue to 
blight elections in Cambodia. It must be stressed that the 
concerns identified in this report need to be dealt with to 
ensure that future elections are not similarly blighted. If such 
corrosive practices are left unaddressed this might limit the 
democratic possibilities in Cambodia.” Final Report, 03.02.02 
Nicaragua 2001  Presidential & 
Parliamentary 
“The national elections of November 4 in Nicaragua can be 
considered a success in the sense that they took place timely 
and peacefully, and that candidates without major complaints 
accepted the results. But the picture seems less convincing 
from the broader perspective of the consolidation of 
democracy and the role of international assistance in 
democracy building.” Final Report 
Sri Lanka 2001  Parliamentary  “In delivering an overall verdict on the election two 
fundamental issues need to be addressed. Firstly did the 
violence, abuses and attempted malpractice prevent the people 
of Sri Lanka from exercising their democratic rights? 
Secondly, did these and other factors distort the election 
result? The answer to the first question is no. (…) As regards 
the second question, although the EUEOM would have 
preferred that the Election Commissioner should have been 
supported by all the political parties in his desire to re-poll 
affected districts, we recognise that any re-poll would not have 
significantly affected the overall outcome which in our view 
did reflect the will of the electorate”. Final Report, 01.02 02 
Bangladesh 2001  Parliamentary  “The electoral process in Bangladesh was marred by several 
serious problems. (…) However, the bodies responsible for the 
conduct of the election demonstrated impartiality; (…) The 
EU EOM confirms its assessment that sufficient conditions of 
fairness for the participants and of freedom of choice for the 
electorate were guaranteed.” Final Report 
Guyana 2001  General & 
Regional  
“In general these elections have met most of the international 
benchmarks to which the election commission has acceded”. 
Guyana Long Term Observation Group & European Union 
EOM, 21.03.01 
East Timor 2001  Constituent  
Assembly  
“As one of the major donors to East Timor, the European 
Union is glad to note the remarkable success of this election.” 
Summary of Provisional Findings of EU EOM, 31.08.01 
Zambia 2001  Presidential & 
Parliamentary  
“In view of the administrative failures on polling day, the 
serious flaws in the counting and tabulation procedures, 
together with the close outcome of the elections, we are not 
confident that the declared results represent the wishes of the 
Zambian electors on polling day.” Final Statement, 05.02.02  
Peru 2001  Presidential & 
Congressional 
“The 2001 elections have fully conformed to international 
electoral standards.” Final Report   
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About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
  Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS Annual Conference) and internet and media 
relations.